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Abstract: This paper describes a framework for practical reasoning in the presence of
norms. We describe a formal normative model constructed using Action-based Alternating
Transition Systems (AATSs). This model is able to represent the obligations and prohibi-
tions present in a multi-agent system, as well as their violation, together with permissions
which are used to derogate the former. Our model also captures the notion of a goal. Inspired
by Atkinson’s scheme for practical reasoning, we then show how the possible executions of
the system can be described through argumentation schemes and critical questions, allow-
ing us to determine if sufficient information has been provided in order to perform practical
reasoning, and to explain why specific sequences of actions were executed by agents within
the system.
Keywords: Argumentation, Norms, Argument Schemes
1 Introduction
The violation of a norm, as expressed through obligations, permissions and prohibitions, can
result in sanctions being imposed on the agent. Since such sanctions are undesirable, the agent
will attempt to comply with its norms while pursuing goals. Norms therefore provide some
control over the behaviour of an agent, imposing soft constraints upon it. When pursuing some
goal, the agent must take its norms into account. If we assume some notion of rationality,
the agent can violate a norm if the reward in doing so is greater than complying with the
norm. Therefore, when performing practical reasoning, an agent must weigh up the penalties
(and rewards) involved in violating (or adhering to) norms against the rewards provided by
achieving its goals.
Now while practical reasoning frameworks taking norms into account have been previously
proposed (e.g. [3]), explaining the decision processes taken by agents when acting in such a
system, particularly to non-experts, is a difficult task. The aim of this paper is to investigate
how argumentation can contribute to such explanations.
Decision and game theory provide processes whereby a rational agent (i.e. one that attempts
to maximise some utility, or reach a most preferred state) can identify an optimal sequence of
actions. We claim that in the practical reasoning domain, such processes can be more easily
understood through argument schemes, with the evaluation of all instantiations of the scheme
together with the relevant associated critical questions forming an argumentation framework.
The evaluation of this argument framework will then identify the appropriate action(s) to pur-
sue.
In this paper we propose a semantics for norms and goals that can be used to trace the
execution of a system. The forward simulation of a normative system then forms the core of the
practical reasoning process. Building on this formal system, we introduce an argument scheme
together with the appropriate critical questions, which forms the heart of our approach.
1
In the next section we describe our formal model in detail. Following this, Section 3 intro-
duces the argument scheme and maps it to our formal model. An example of the approach is
provided in Section 4, and we discuss related and future work in Section 5, before concluding
the paper in Section 6.
2 The Model
In this section we describe our formal model, which is based on action-based alternating tran-
sition systems (AATS) [9]. Such AATSs are intended to encode all possible evolutions of a
system due to the actions of all agents within it, representing the various states through which
the system can pass through by means of a branching time tree structure. Since this can be seen
as a Kripke system, we can then describe a semantics over the system by means of a branching
time logic. After introducing the basic concepts of AATSs, we detail how goals and norms,
as well as more complex concepts such as violations and the derogation of obligations can be
specified.
2.1 Semantics
Definition 1 (AATS, [9]) An Action-based alternating transition system (AATS) is a tuple
of the form
S = 〈Q, q0, Ag,Ac1, . . . Acn, ρ, τ,Φ, pi〉
Where
• Q is a finite non-empty set of states.
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state.
• Ag = {1, . . . , n} is a finite non-empty set of agents.
• Aci, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is a finite and non-empty set of actions for each agent, where actions
for different agents do not overlap.
• ρ : Aci → 2Q is an action precondition function which identifies the set of states from
which some action α ∈ Aci can be executed
• τ : Q×JAg → Q where JAg =
∏
i∈Ag Aci, is the system transition function identifying the
state that results from executing a set of actions from within JAg in some state.
• Φ is a finite and non-empty set of atomic propositions
• pi : Q→ 2Φ is the interpretation function which identifies the set of propositions satisfied
in each state.
Following [9], we define a computation (also referred to as a path) to be an infinite sequence
of states λ = q0, q1, . . .. We index a state within a path using array notation. Thus, the first
element of path λ can be referenced via λ[0], while a sub-path of the path starting at the second
element and consisting of the remainder of the path is written λ[1,∞] . We label the set of all
possible paths Λ.
An AATS encodes the possible states of the world that result from executing actions, and
can be viewed as a Kripke structure via the transition function τ . We can then represent
the AATS through CTL* [4], allowing us to refer to both single paths and groups of paths in
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the structure. We define the semantics in two stages, first defining state formulae, following
which we describe path formulae. Note that the syntax of the logic emerges directly from the
semantics, and therefore, due to space constraints, is not detailed.
Definition 2 (State Formulae) State formulae are evaluated with respect to an AATS S and
a state q ∈ Q:
S, q |= >
S, q 6|= ⊥
S, q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q)
S, q |= ¬ψ iff S, q 6|= ψ
S, q |= ψ ∨ φ iff S, q |= ψ or S, q |= φ
S, q |= Aψ iff S, γ |= ψ for all paths where λ[0] = q
S, q |= Eψ iff S, γ |= ψ for some path where λ[0] = q
Now, a strategy for an agent i identifies the action that the agent should take in any state, and
is therefore represented as a function σi : Q → Aci. Similarly, a strategy profile for a group of
agents G = {a1, . . . ak} where G ⊆ Ag is a tuple of strategies ΣG = 〈σ1, . . . , σk〉. Given a state
q and a strategy profile σG, we define comp(σG , q) to be the set of possible computations that
exist starting at state q and that occur when the group follows their strategy profile. This set
of computations forms a tree of states, and λ ∈ comp(σG , q) then identifies a path through the
tree. From this, we define the following path formulae:
Definition 3 (Path Formulae) Path formulae are evaluated with respect to an AATS S and
a path λ ∈ comp(σg , q):
S, λ||= ψ iff S, λ[0] |= ψ where ψ is a state formula.
S, λ||= ¬ψ iff S, λ 3 ψ
S, λ||= ψ ∨ φ iff S, λ||= ψ or S, λ||= φ
S, λ||=©ψ iff S, λ[1,∞]||= ψ
S, λ||= ♦ψ iff ∃u ∈ N s.t. S, λ[u,∞]||= ψ
S, λ||= ψ iff ∀u ∈ N S, λ[u,∞]||= ψ
S, λ||= φUψ iff ∃u ∈ N s.t. S, λ[u,∞]||= ψ and ∀v s.t. 0 ≤ v < u, S, λ[v,∞]||= φ
Note that state formulae refer to states, and their semantics therefore refer only to a single state
within a path, even in the case when the state operator then refers to a path formula (c.f. the
A and E operators). Path formulae always refer to entire, infinite paths which begin at some
state (e.g. the next state in the case of the © operator).
These semantics capture the evolution of a system over time due to agent actions. However,
it says nothing about why one strategy should be followed over another in order to effect certain
actions and therefore lead to certain states. To capture this notion we define a relation over
paths, written g to represent the preferences of some group of agents g’s of one group of paths
over another. This group of paths is specified by means of a path formula. Thus, for example,
♦a {α} ♦¬a captures the preference of agent α for those paths in which a is eventually true
over those paths where it is eventually false. When dealing with a single agent, or referring to a
group by a label, we will often write α instead of {α}. When the risk of confusion is low, we
will compare two specific paths using the g operator. Therefore, given two paths λ and λ′, we
write λ g λ′ if there is some pair of path formulae χ, χ′ such that λ satisfies χ and λ′ satisfies
χ′ and χ g χ′. Finally, we write λ g λ′ to represent the case when λ g λ′ and λ′ 6g λ, and
abbreviate the situation where both λ g λ′ and λ′ g λ hold as λ ∼g λ′.
Now a question arises as to the origin and form of the preference relation, and we propose
that the agent’s goals, together with the norms found in the system constrain (but do not fully
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specify) it. For example, a goal should imply that those paths in which the goal is achieved are
preferred to those paths where it is not, but such a goal does not impose any preference ordering
between those paths in which the goal is achieved (or indeed between those paths where it is
not). We begin a more detailed exploration of the preference relationship by examining goals
more closely.
2.2 Goals
Goals identify states of affairs in the world that an agent prefers (and should be able to bring
about in part due to their action, but we do not formally impose this requirement). In other
words, when undertaking practical reasoning, agents prefer those actions forming paths wherein
their goals are achieved to those where they are not. We therefore represent goals through path
formulae, identifying the state of affairs that must exist for a goal to be considered as met or
satisfied.
Work such as [5] has identified two overarching types of goals, namely achievement goals and
maintenance goals. The former identifies a state of affairs that must hold at some point in time,
while the latter requires some state of affairs to be maintained until some deadline. Both of these
goals can be easily represented in our logic. For example, a goal to achieve some proposition x
before a deadline d can be written as ¬dUx, while a maintenance obligation requiring x to be
the case until deadline d can be written as (¬d ∧ x)Ud1. Note that open ended goals (e.g. a
goal to simply achieve x, written ♦x) are also possible. In fact, all of Allen’s interval operators
[1] can be captured in our logic.
We begin by assuming that goals are not conditional (i.e. a goal cannot be of the form
X → γ where X is some logical sentence and γ is a goal). In such a situation, a maintenance
goal must be adhered to from the current point in time until its deadline in order to be seen
as achieved. Since achieving a goal γ is preferred by the agent over not achieving the goal, we
identify a preference ordering over possible paths, expressed by the simple rule
♦γ α ¬γ
That is, paths in which the goal is (eventually) achieved are preferred by the agent to those
in which the goal is never achieved2
2.3 Norms
Norms within a system represent obligations, prohibitions and permissions imposed on, or
provided to, entities within a society or group. Obligations and prohibitions (respectively)
identify the states of affairs that a target must ensure do (or do not) occur. If these states
of affairs do not/do occur, then the norm is violated. We treat permissions as exceptions to
obligations and prohibitions: in the case of an obligation, if a state of affairs is ordinarily obliged,
but a permission not to achieve the state exists, then even if the state of affairs is not achieved,
no violation occurs.
Now we view norms primarily as social constructs. That is, an obligation (for example)
specifies who should behave in some way (i.e. it has a set of target agents), and also identifies
which agent — or set of agents — desires that this behaviour occur. The latter form the norm’s
creditors (c.f. [8]).
Following this perspective, we view a norm as expressing a preference over a state of affairs
for its creditors rather than its target. That is, a creditor prefers those situations in which a
1The semantics of U are existential, that is, we need to ensure that the deadline does not occur before it does.
2The inclusion of conditional goals via material implication would require paths in which the condition does
not occur but the goal is satisfied to be less preferred to paths where the conditional does not occur.
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norm is not violated to one where it is. Now this implies that a norm, in isolation, has no direct
effect on its target’s behaviour. Instead, we claim that such behaviour regulation stems from
two sources. First, the violation of a norm could (via contrary-to-duties) permit a sanction to
be imposed on the violator. Second, social ties could mean that a norm’s target takes the norm
creditor’s preferences into account (e.g. I may fulfil my obligations to my friends because I care
about their feelings rather than any threat of sanctions). Note however that in our argument
framework, we merge all individual agent preferences into a global preference, limiting the effects
of this approach; investigating a more “local” view of preferences forms part of our future work.
Now, obligations identify states of affairs that should be achieved by the target of the
obligation. Obligations are social constructs, imposed by some group (the creditor) on the
target. Furthermore, if an obligation is not fulfilled, then the creditor could potentially sanction
the obligation’s target. An obligation therefore encodes two concepts, namely the preference by
the creditor for paths wherein the obligation is fulfilled over those where it is not. Second, if an
obligation is not fulfilled, then a record must be kept that it has been violated.
We consider two distinct types of obligations, namely achievement obligations, which require
the target to see to it that some state of affairs holds at some point before some deadline occurs,
and maintenance obligations, which require the target to ensure that the state of affairs holds
at all points before the deadline. Before formally defining obligations, we must examine the
notion of a permission, which we consider as an exception to an obligation.
Permission acts as an exception to an obligation (or a prohibition). In other words, given an
obligation to achieve some state of affairs, and a permission not to achieve it, not achieving this
state of affairs will not result in a violation. Now, as discussed previously, we model prohibitions
through obligations, and therefore concentrate on the interactions between permissions and
obligations. Like other modalities, a permission is given by some creditor to a target, and
affects the creditor’s concept of a violation. Similarly, permissions identify some (permitted)
state of affairs, and a deadline.
Clearly, interpreting a permission in this way makes little sense without an obligation or
prohibition being present, and we therefore encode permissions through the presence of a permis-
sion predicate3 which prevents a violation from occurring. We write this permission predicate
as perm(a, g, x) where a is the target of the permission, g the creditor and x the permitted state
of affairs.Together, these parameters uniquely identify a permission. Formally, a permission is
then defined through the following equivalence:
P ga (x|d) ≡ Aperm(a, g, x)Ud
Since we must ensure that the permission predicate does not hold when no permission is in
force, we must require the following axiom in the system:
A(¬P ga (x|d)→ ¬perm(a, g, x))
Obligations identify states of affairs that should hold, and a failure to abide by the require-
ments of an obligation leads to a violation. We encode such a violation through a predicate,
in a manner similar to the permission predicate. In other words, the predicate viol(a, g, x, d)
represents a violation by the target a of the obligation, with respect to a creditor g, to see to it
that state of affairs x was the case with respect to a deadline d.
An achievement obligation requiring the target to ensure that some state of affairs holds
before a deadline is represented as follows:
Oga(x|d) ≡ A(¬viol(a, g, x, d) ∧ ¬d ∧ ¬x)U (((¬x ∧ d ∧ ¬perm(a, g,¬x) ∧ viol(a, g, x, d))∨
(¬x ∧ d ∧ perm(a, g,¬x) ∧ ¬viol(a, g, x, d)))∨
(x ∧ ¬viol(a, g, x, d)))
3This predicate can be trivially translated to a proposition.
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That is, an obligation on target a from creditor g to see to it that x is the case before deadline
d requires the following conditions to be met on all possible paths:
1. Before either the deadline or x occurs, the obligation is not considered violated.
2. If the deadline occurs and x is not the case, then if there is no permission to maintain ¬x,
then a violation is recorded. Alternatively, if such a permission exists, then no violation
is recorded.
3. Finally, if x is achieved (before the deadline), then no violation is recorded.
Therefore, our encoding of an obligation essentially states that if an obligation is in force,
it is only violated if the deadline is reached without the desired state of affairs being achieved,
assuming that no permission exists allowing the obligation to be ignored. However, nothing
in this definition prevents a violation from existing in a state of affairs without an associated
obligation. We therefore require that the following axiom hold:
A(¬Oga(x|d)→ ¬viol(a, g, x, d))
Maintenance obligations requires that a state of affairs be maintained until some deadline4, and
are defined as follows:
Oga(m : d) ≡ A ((¬x ∧ ¬d ∧ (¬perm(a, g,¬x) ∧ viol(a, g,m, d))∨
(perm(a, g,¬x) ∧ ¬viol(a, g,m, d))) ∨ (x ∧ ¬d))Ud
In other words, before the deadline, either x is maintained, or x is not maintained, in which
case the obligation is violated if an associated permission does not exist.
The requirement for the lack of a violation, as stated above, is repeated for maintenance
obligations: A(¬Oga(x : d)→ ¬viol(a, g, x, d))
In discussing obligations so far, we have identified the situations in which they are violated.
Detecting these situations allows for the modelling of contrary to duty obligations, which come
into force when a violation occurs. Such contrary to duties are a form of conditional obligation,
which comes into force only when some state of affairs holds in the environment, and generally,
such conditionals can be represented via an implication relation, for example, viol(a, g, x, d)→
Oga(x′|d′).
We now turn our attention to the second aspect of obligations, namely their interactions
with preferences over paths through the system. Informally, the presence of an obligation or
prohibition imposed by some creditor leads to that creditor preferring those paths through the
system where the obligation is complied with (i.e. not violated) over those where it is violated.
This leads to the following rule within our system:
¬viol(a, g, x, d) g ♦viol(a, g, x, d)
Note that we do not prefer fewer violations over more violations, as other preferences, for
example regarding the interval length of a violation, could affect the preference ordering.
In this work we consider only achievement prohibitions, that is, prohibitions on seeing to it
that a state of affairs holds (until the prohibition’s deadline occurs). Such a prohibition can in
fact be modelled as a maintenance obligation: F ga (x|d) ≡ Oga(¬x|d)
4We assume that this maintenance requirement comes into force with the obligation, ignoring obligations of
the form “maintain x between 5pm and 8pm tomorrow”.
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3 Argumentation Scheme
Our formal model contains two distinct aspects. The first aspect consists of the AATS, which
identifies all possible evolutions of the system, while the second aspect is associated with the
preferences over paths (i.e. sequence of actions). From the practical reasoning point of view,
each path through the AATS –which identifies one possible run within the system– can be
justified, and represents a single instance of the argument scheme
AS1: In situation S, joint actions A1, . . . An should be executed.
This argument scheme is associated with two critical questions:
CQ1-1 Does some other sequence of actions exist that can be executed?
CQ1-2 Is there a more preferred sequence of actions to this one?
Now in order to justify why one sequence of actions should be followed over another, we must
show that it is the most preferred action sequence, and explain why this is the case. In order to
do this, we now introduce additional argument schemes which are associated with preferences
over paths.
AS2: The sequence of joint actions A1, . . . , An is preferred over A
′
1, . . . A
′
n as the former
achieves a goal which the latter does not. Critical questions here are as follows:
CQ2-1 Is there some other sequence of actions which achieves a more preferred goal than the one
achieved by this action sequence?
CQ2-2 Does the sequence of actions lead to the violation of a norm?
We can associate two related argument schemes with obligations and prohibitions:
AS3: The sequence of actions A1, . . . An should be less preferred than sequence A
′
1, . . . A
′
n
as the former violates a norm while the latter does not.
CQ3-1 Is the goal resulting from the sequence of actions more preferred than the violation?
CQ3-2 Does the violation resulting from this norm result in some other, more preferred norm not
being violated?
CQ3-3 Is there a permission that derogates the violation?
AS4: There is a permission that derogates the violation of an obligation.
Finally, we can identify several simple argument schemes that allow an agent to associate
preferences between different goals and norms:
AS5: Agent α prefers goal g over goal g′
AS6: Agent α prefers achieving goal g to not violating n
AS7: Agent α prefers not achieving goal g to violating n
AS8: Agent α prefers violating n to violating n′
We now provide a formalisation of the argument schemes and critical questions based on our
AATS semantics. Below, we speak about action sequences which are equivalent to paths through
the AATS. We label our AATS S, and write S for the logical closure of S.
AS1: Given an initial state q0 ∈ Q and a sequence of joint actions j1, . . . jn such that for
all i = 1 . . . n, τ(qi−1, ji) = qi, this joint action sequence should be executed.
AS2: Given an initial state q0 ∈ Q and a preference relation over paths =
⋃
a a and two
paths λ, λ′ where λ is the path obtained from the sequence of joint actions j1, . . . jn such that
for all i = 1 . . . n, τ(qi−1, ji) = qi, and λ′ is the path obtained from the sequence of joint actions
j′1, . . . j′n where i′ = 1 . . . n, τ(qi′−1, j′i′) = qi′ there is a goal g such that S, λ |= g and S, λ′ 6|= g
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AS3: Given an initial state q0 ∈ Q and two paths, λ, λ′ where λ is the path obtained from
the sequence of joint actions j1, . . . jn such that for all i = 1 . . . n, τ(qi−1, ji) = qi, and λ′ is the
path obtained from the sequence of joint actions j′1, . . . j′n where i′ = 1 . . . n, τ(qi′−1, j′i′) = qi′ ,
S, λ |= Oga(x|d) and S\perm(a, x, d), λ |= viol(a, g, x, d) and S, λ′ 6|= Og(x|d)
AS4: Given an initial state q0 ∈ Q and a path λ obtained from the sequence of joint actions
j1, . . . jn such that for all i = 1 . . . n, τ(qi−1, ji) = qi, S, λ |= Oga(x|d→ perm(a, x, d).
While the formalisation of AS3 and AS4 is with regards to a maintenance obligation, it is
trivial to modify these to handle achievements; we avoid doing so due to space.
Several additional argument schemes, expressing preferences between goals and norms are
not obtained through the system’s underlying logic, but rather through an agent’s specific
preferences. Given two paths, λ, λ′ where λ is the path obtained from the sequence of joint
actions j1, . . . jn such that for all i = 1 . . . n, τ(qi−1, ji) = qi, and λ′ is the path obtained from
the sequence of joint actions j′1, . . . j′n where i′ = 1 . . . n, τ(qi′−1, j′i′) = qi′ , we define these
argument schemes as follows:
AS5: S, λ |= g and S, λ′ |= g′ and g α g′
AS6: g α ¬viol(α, h, x, d) for some h, x, d
AS7: ¬g α viol(α, h, x, d) for some h, x, d
AS8: viol(α, h, x, d) α viol(α, i, y, e) for some h, x, d, i, y, e.
AS9: A α B where A,B are formulae in our language.
Now let us turn our attention to the critical questions, using the same definitions as above.
CQ1-1: There is a sequence of joint actions j′1, . . . j′n such that for some i ∈ 1 . . . n ji 6= j′i.
CQ1-2: There is an instance of AS2 or AS3 whose path λ is this instance of AS1.
CQ2-1: There an instance of AS5 whose less preferred goal is the one identified by this
instantiation of AS2.
CQ2-2: There is an instantiation of AS7 which refers to some AS2 which has the same goal
g and AS3 with norm n.
CQ3-1: There is an instantiation of AS6 which refers to some AS2 which has the same goal
g and AS3 with norm n.
CQ3-2: There is an instantiation of AS8 which refers to two instances of AS3 with obliga-
tions or prohibitions n, n′.
CQ3-3: There is an instantiation of AS4 which refers to some instance of AS3 with obli-
gation or prohibition n.
3.1 Instantiating the Framework
We instantiate the framework described above using Modgil’s extended argument frameworks
[6] (EAF). Formally, an EAF is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Extended Argument Framework) An EAF is a tuple (Args, R,D) such that
Args is a set of arguments, R ⊆ Args × Args, and D ⊆ Args ×R subject to the constraint that
if (C, (A,B)), (C ′, (B,A)) ∈ D, then (C,C ′), (C ′, C) ∈ R
Now, each instantiation of any of the argument schemes is associated with an argument within
our EAF, and each critical question is associated with an attack. The constraint imposed
on EAFs causes additional attacks to appear that are not described by the critical questions.
We describe the process of EAF instantiation informally due to both space concerns and its
simplicity.
CQ1-1 arises since only one sequence of actions can ultimately be executed, and results in
symmetric attacks being inserted into R between every pair of nodes instantiating AS1. CQ1-2
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refers to preferences between actions and following [7], is captured via an attack from the node
representing the argument to the appropriate attacking edge.
CQ2-1, CQ2-2, CQ3-1 and CQ3-2 capture preferences over goals and norms. That is, they
are used to represent the fact that one goal (or norm) is preferred over some other goal (or
norm) by entities in the system. All of these link the appropriate argument, as instantiated by
AS5-8 via an attack, on the attack from the argument instantiated by the appropriate AS2 or
AS3.
Finally, CQ3-3 encompasses the possibility of a violation being derogated by a permission,
and in instantiated as an attack from AS8 to the appropriate AS3.
Given the above, CQ1-1 and CQ3-3 result in attacks added to R, while the remaining critical
questions result in attacks added to D. Together with the attacks added by the constraint, these
attacks between the arguments instantiated from the application of the argument schemes fully
specify our EAF.
Given an EAF instantiated as above, all the preferred extensions of the EAF will contain
a single argument from argument scheme AS1 for some specific action sequence to be executed
iff this action sequence is most preferred by all agents in the system. This sequence of actions
is the dominant strategy for all agents in the system.
4 Example
In this section, we provide a brief example of the framework in action. Due to space constraints,
we do not present all details of the system in our example, but instead concentrate on the most
important aspects of the system’s operation.
Consider two agents, α and β. α can undertake two actions, namely to visit her ill mother
in hospital (V ), or go to work (W ). β, who is α’s boss, has two possible actions, namely to fire
α (F ), or not fire her (N). α has two (conflicting) goals: to visit her mother (vm), and to keep
her job (kj), while β would like to see some work done (wd), which can only occur if α goes
to work. Finally, β has an obligation to not fire α, but has permission to do so if she does not
turn up to work.
The AATS for this example is shown in the top left of Figure 1, and instantiating the EAF
results in the main graph of Figure 1. Within this graph, paths from the AATS are indicated
through nodes containing the path number; preference information is encoded through the
propositions true in the state (e.g. 1 > 3 kj indicate that path 1 is preferred to path 3 due
to α’s preference to keep her job; the permission to fire is indicated via the per node, and
nvl identifies preference nodes instantiated through the prohibition on firing α. Dashed lines
indicate attacks due to actions being mutually exclusive, while solid lines capture preference
based attacks.
Evaluating the preferred extension of this EAF indicates that multiple actions are possible;
for example, paths {1,2} are present in one of the extensions. This means that the system’s
preferences are underspecified. Looking at the situation more closely, this occurs for several
reasons. First, α does not have any preferences encoded between going to the hospital or
keeping her job; prioritising one of these (by adding attacks on edges between kj and vm)
reduces the number of arguments for action in the extension, for example, if vm is preferred
over kj, only path 2 remains in the extension indicating that α should visit her mother and
keep her job.
This odd result arises because while β has permission to fire α if she does not turn up to
work, no preferences are expressed over whether β would prefer this situation to one where α
keeps her job. Adding an additional preferences over paths, through a new goal for β stating
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Figure 1: The AATS (top left) and EAF (main figure) of the example.
result in α losing her job if she visits her mother in hospital (path 4). Note that due to the
permission, there is no need to then express another preference for β between this goal and the
norm on not firing α; without the permission, such an additional preference would be necessary.
5 Discussion and Future Work
In practice, there are several ways of using the framework proposed here, each of which poses an
avenue for future research. First, as done in the example above, a given AATS could be converted
to an EAF and evaluated in order to identify whether sufficient preference information has been
provided in order to reach a decision about a sequence of actions. The potential exponential
growth in the number of arguments with respect to AATS size makes this approach practical
for only small AATSs.
Second, a dialogue game could be formulated — and verified against an AATS — based
on arguments and attacks instantiated from the argument schemes and critical questions. This
would then involve agents arguing for why some course of action should be taken and providing
their preferences for certain outcomes as appropriate.
Third, and perhaps most novel, an instantiated EAF could be used as the basis of a process
to explain why some sequence of actions was followed given agents with some goals and norms.
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A user could, for example, understand that an action was executed as while a norm was violated,
the goal achieved was more important to the agents in the system than the violation.
Our work borrows several ideas from Atkinson’s argument scheme for practical reasoning
based on values [2]. Atkinson’s approach puts both goals and values at the centre of the
argumentation scheme, stating that “in situation S, action A should be pursued in order to
achieve goal G while promoting values V ”. This argument scheme is encoded through a VAF,
which is used to represent the preferences of different audiences over values. Each argument
within the VAF can be associated with several values, but an audience’s value ordering must
be fully specified and consistent.
Now in the current work, preferences (which have a similar role to values in Atkinson’s
work) are associated with different sequences of action due to the goals that these sequences
achieve for the agents as well as the norms violated or complied with by the sequence. Given
this, our AS-1 argument scheme is much simpler than Atkinson’s, stating that (by default)
some sequence of actions should be executed, and requiring all possible sequences of actions to
be mutually exclusive with each other. Deciding how to act then requires identifying the most
preferred sequence of actions.
Our representation of preferences within an EAF is based on [7], which applied EAFs to
VAFs. While there are many similarities between our instantiated EAF and the EAF based
VAF approach, the requirement of VAFs to have a single consistent preference ordering makes
them unsuitable for our needs; as shown in the example, we explicitly concern ourselves with
detecting inconsistent preference orderings.
In one sense, the work presented here takes a global view of norms and actions. We consider
joint actions, and require that all agents agree on a path. Such an approach ignores an important
nuances of practical reasoning: agents may be force to pursue sub-optimal goals due to the
actions of other agents. Thus, while our approach currently finds dominant strategies, it is
unable to find other game theoretic solution concepts (e.g. Nash equilibria); we believe that
capturing these additional solution concepts is critical, and are currently investigating how
these concepts can be captured using our approach.
Another avenue of future work involves integrating our practical reasoning over norms with
reasoning over values. This, in combination with the already present capability to reason over
goals, should provide an end-to-end practical reasoning formalism.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a representation for norms built on top of an AATS. Using this
representation we described how arguments over norms can be constructed, allowing for the
detection of inconsistencies when performing practical reasoning, the explanation of why some
action was taken, and making a decision about how to act in the presence of both goals and
norms.
References
[1] J. F. Allen. Maintaining knowledge about temporal intervals. Commun. ACM, 26:832–843,
November 1983.
[2] K. Atkinson and T. J. M. Bench-Capon. Practical reasoning as presumptive argumentation
using action based alternating transition systems. Artif. Intell., 171(10-15):855–874, 2007.
11
[3] J. Broersen, M. Dastani, J. Hulstijn, Z. Huang, and L. van der Torre. The BOID architecture:
conflicts between beliefs, obligations, intentions and desires. In J. P. Mu¨ller, E. Andre, S. Sen,
and C. Frasson, editors, Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Autonomous
Agents (AAMAS 2001), pages 9–16, Montreal, Canada, 2001.
[4] E. A. Emerson and J. Y. Halpern. ‘sometimes’ and ‘not never’ revisited: on branching versus
linear time temporal logic. J. ACM, 33(1):151–178, Jan. 1986.
[5] K. V. Hindriks and M. B. van Riemsdijk. Satisfying maintenance goals. In Proceedings of
the 5th international conference on Declarative agent languages and technologies V, volume
4897 of DALT’07, pages 86–103, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. Springer-Verlag.
[6] S. Modgil. Reasoning about preferences in argumentation frameworks. Artificial Intelligence,
173(9–10):901–934, 2009.
[7] S. Modgil and T. J. M. Bench-Capon. Metalevel argumentation. Journal of Logic and
Computation, 21(6):959–1003, 2011.
[8] M. P. Singh. An ontology for commitments in multiagent systems: Toward a unification of
normative concepts. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 7:97–113, 1999.
[9] W. van der Hoek, M. Roberts, and M. Wooldridge. Social laws in alternating time: effec-
tiveness, feasibility, and synthesis. Synthese, 156:1–19, 2007.
12
